Proclivities for Terrorism in the Republic of Mali
Proclivities for Terrorism in the Republic of Mali
by John M. Thomas, Jr.
May 2002
Americans recognize, especially since September 11, 2001, that the phenomenon of international terrorism is not to be confined to one corner or the world or another, altering the long-standing psychological denial by the American populace of the possibility of a substantial foreign terrorist attack on American soil. The prevention of future acts of terrorism, now a topic of much greater interest in the U.S., will be a multifaceted process which will includes the development of skills needed to predict where international terrorists might find safe harbor in the future. These “breeding grounds” of terrorism that have enabled transnational terrorists groups to thrive must be identified and acted upon to prevent the growth and development of terror spawned from these regions.
Many quarters bear watching, but how does one predict which areas will become a breeding ground for terrorism? The National Intelligence Council (NIC), a federal agency which serves as “a center for U.S. Government mid-term and long-term strategic thinking and for Intelligence Community collaboration on substantive issues,” has attempted to answer that question.1 In one of its recent publications, the NIC theorizes that “states with poor governance; ethnic, cultural, or religious tensions; weak economies; and porous borders will be prime breeding grounds for terrorism. In such states, domestic groups will challenge the entrenched government, and transnational networks [will seek] safehavens.”2 The NIC also believes that “the trend away from state-supported political terrorism and toward more diverse, free-wheeling, transnational networks—enabled by information technology—will continue.”3
These opinions of the NIC represent a synthesis of the thinking of many in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other U.S. government intelligence and intelligence-related agencies. As such, this four-pronged “theory of causes” (TOC) provides a point of departure for examining the likelihood of the genesis of terrorism in a given area. This paper will use the TOC to evaluate one such area, the Republic of Mali, and, in particular, will consider whether areas populated by the Tuareg in Northern Mali could be particularly vulnerable to an increased terrorist presence.
A few words of introduction are in order regarding the obscure state to be explored. The “Mali Federation” is a former French colony that gained its independence in 1960. At this time a federation consisting of Senegal and the present-day Republic of Mali was created. The Senegalese withdrew from the “Mali Federation” soon after independence, leaving the landlocked “Sudanese Republic,” which was soon to be renamed the Republic of Mali, to fend for itself.
The early years of the Republic of Mali were tumultuous. Mali’s second military dictator, Moussa Traore, was eventually elected to office under a functioning constitution. After years of severe drought while relying on agriculture as the prime element of the economy, Traore was overthrown in 1991, and a democratic constitution was ratified with a civilian presidency.
Mali’s north consists of desert and semi-desert, is sparsely populated, and is culturally much different than the south, which largely uses the Niger River as the basis for economic activity. Mali has a population near eleven million, possesses few natural resources, has a large debt, and has an economy that is very vulnerable to fluctuations in the world economy and demand for its primary export, cotton.
Applying the first criteria of the TOC (poor governance) to the Republic of Mali, several issues arise here regarding the strength of Malian state since it achieved independence from its colonial ruler. While Mali enjoys a high degree of democratic rule at the present time, the Republic has not always enjoyed such freedoms since decolonization and is subject to the winds of political fortune that frequently blow through the African continent, taking with them leaders and systems of government alike. Malian leaders, in the early days of independence, pandered to the interests of the Eastern Bloc in return for economic and military support, then within a few short years vacillated and sought Western help for their fledgling state. A mere Army lieutenant was able to effect the coup in 1968 that turned Mali more decisively to the West, underlining further the underdeveloped and vulnerable nature of the Malian political and military system at the time. Democratization can be said to have begun in Mali in earnest only more than two decades later in 1990, shortly before Traore was overthrown.4
Considering how recently democratic trends have taken root and developed in Mali, the permanence of such a change is questionable at best. Mali is still vulnerable to a return to one-party rule, which had previously brought brutal political oppression and more widespread corruption.5 The qualities of poor governance implied in the TOC would likely return under one-party rule, which would put the Republic of Mali at risk with respect to this criteria.
Secondly, the TOC mentions “ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions” as creating the necessary environment for the development of terrorist activity. At first glance, Mali scores high in the area of religious homogeneity, seemingly a major plus for stability in the evaluation of this criteria. Ninety percent of the population is Muslim, with the balance being practitioners of some form of native religion, as well as a few Christians.6
The Muslim population, however, deserves some scrutiny as to its sectarian nature both historically and presently. In the early half of the 20th century, the population of “French Soudan” became susceptible to a Sufi-like movement within Islam known as Hamallism. The movement consisted of “vassal tribes reacting against the Mauritanian Qâdiriyya and the Tukulor Tijâniyya orders which collaborated with the colonial power [France] and had a privileged position in society.”7 The Hamallists declared jihad against the colonial masters and their tribal partners and offered violent resistence,8 but the French soon left on their own accord, obviating the need for and effectively ending the movement. Violent religious doctrines which could facilitate terrorism have thus been developed in Mali in the past and certainly stand a chance for recurrence in the future.
Mali, like most sub-Saharan African states, is an amalgam of various ethnic and cultural groups vying for power and influence. Strictly speaking, nearly all African states south of the Sahara would fail this part of the second criteria of the TOC outright. Mali is no exception. The CIA Factbook cites eight easily identifiable ethnic groups, three of which are related but together still compose only about half of the population, leaving the other five groups to comprise forty-five percent of the population.9 This means, at any given time, at least four ethnic groups (or their representatives) are required to agree to form a majority. In Mali, like most African states, representative government can be fractured by ethnic disputes, risking the longevity of democratic government and the stability required for stopping the fulfillment of the previously discussed first criteria of the TOC (poor governance).
The principal example of ethnic and cultural tension in Mali involves the Tuareg people of the northern part of the country. This specific example will be entertained later in this paper at some length.
The third criteria of the TOC is a weak economy. Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world with sixty-five percent of its area desert or semidesert, a GDP per capita of US$850, and few natural resources.10 It would be difficult to argue that the citizens of the Republic of Mali are, by and large, well enough off to be invulnerable to the financial incentives that could come their way as a result of a growth in the presence of terrorists in Mali. The hard cash that a well-organized terrorist movement could bring into this country would make a substantial material difference in the quality of the lives of the collaborators.
Undesirable economic conditions can also raise the level of dissatisfaction with standard-of-living and prospects for the future. This dissatisfaction is believed by some to be a component in the development of militant fundamentalist Islam and other forms of thought that can engender terrorism.11 This discontent weighs as well in the previously discussed second criteria of the TOC (ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions), with economic circumstances exacerbating social unrest.
The fourth criteria of the TOC, the presence of porous borders around the state in question, lends itself to one very simple analysis. A great deal of Mali’s border lies across the sands of the Sahara. Demarcation of such boundaries is often merely a formality, given the relative absence of population and development in these areas. Nomadic peoples frequently criss-cross desert and steppe boundaries in various places around the world without government monitoring.12 Mali, indeed all Saharan states, do not have porous borders. They have open borders to those who are willing to brave the dangers of the desert.
The southern part of the country has its porous border features as well. Mali has been identified by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as one of the principal areas from which slaves are exported in Africa,13 indicating that persons frequently leave the country in an uncontrolled manner. This lack of effective border control is likely to extend not only to those leaving, but also to those entering.
Thus by a simple analysis using the criteria established by the NIC to evaluate geographical areas as future breeding grounds for terrorism, the Republic of Mali bears some attention. All four of the criteria of the TOC are satisfied in at least some basic way, especially the fourth with considerably porous borders conspicuously facilitating the traffic of humans both into and out of the country. Having established this positive analysis, at least two questions are begged. Is Mali more or less vulnerable to playing safe-haven to terrorists than comparable states in the region? Are there any areas of the Republic of Mali that may be more vulnerable than others to terrorist infiltration and development?
To comment on the first question, a lengthier comparative analysis would be more appropriate and is not within the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the nations of Mauritania, Niger, and Chad all share characteristics with Mali that would fit in various ways with the criteria of the TOC. Regionalizing the concerns brought from the analysis of the TOC for Mali would seem a prudent view and could yield useful information on the possible terrorist-support dynamics of the region as well as for each individual country.
The Tuareg are one of the indigenous peoples found in the northern desert and semidesert areas of Mali. Numbering over 600,000 in Mali alone, the Tuareg have been “the most substantial challenge to Mali’s stability since independence.”14 Culturally related to the Berbers, Tuaregs share a common language and ethnicity, but, much like the Somalis, have exhibited high degrees of intertribal and interclan rivalries. After warfare with the French during their colonization period, the Tuareg resisted assimilation into the colonies in favor of retaining their defiant nomadic lifestyle. This continued separation kept the Tuareg “outside the web of political relationships and material benefits of the new states.”15
The Tuareg rebelled against the Malian government on two occasions, in 1962 and 1990. The latter rebellion is of more interest in relationship to the TOC. Political institutions in northern Mali were weak due to the estrangement of the Tuareg from the rest of Malian society. Cultural tensions abounded due to the influx of Western ideas through electronic and written media and their effect on Tuareg society.16 Mali’s economy had been devastated by the African drought that began in 1985. Borders also remained porous to the nomadic Tuaregs. All principal elements of the TOC are qualified as early as the 1990 rebellion, facilitating the possible growth and development of terrorism.
In addition to these TOC qualifications, a direct linkage between the Tuareg and world terror can be found beginning around the time of the first rebellion. Malian Lt. Col. Kalifa Keita writes:
“ [ Muammar ] Qadhafi incorporated some Tuareg volunteers into his
regular military forces. Others, he inducted into a Libyan-sponsored
‘Islamic Legion’ from which he subsequently dispatched Islamic
militants to Lebanon, Palestine, and Afghanistan. By the mid 1980’s, some of
Qadhafi’s Tuareg volunteers had acquired considerable combat
experience in various conflicts of the Near East and South Asia.”17
Many of these “Islamic Legionnaires” returned shortly before the second rebellion and contributed their skills and experience to the insurrection.
Given the satisfaction of several elements of the TOC specifically by the Tuareg occupied areas of northern Mali as well as the presence of elements of Qahhafi’s former army in this region, it stands to reason that northern Mali may prove to be more problematic than other parts of the state with respect to fostering terrorism. The reclusive “Blue Men of the Veil,” as the Tuaregs are often called, fanatical Muslims with easy access to only nominal borders and the inclination to resist central authority, may well find themselves in a crossroads of nascent terror.
As may the state of Mali as a whole, as current events quickly have elucidated. On April 8, 2002, thousands of Malians took to the streets to decry America and Israel for their policies in Palestine. American anti-terrorist operations around the world were denounced, and religious leaders issued religious curses on American leaders for their perceived anti-Islamic prejudices. Political leaders promised to influence Mali’s fledgling electoral process by attempting to get elected as many Islamists to political office as possible.18
The future of the Republic of Mali is fraught with many questions, including those of an economic, political, and social nature. All three of these areas of concern relate directly to the possible future present of terrorist activity and its ability to thrive in the region. This analysis illustrates some basic ways in which Mali may be vulnerable to the disease of terrorism. While Malians rally against America and give verbal support to their radical militant Islamist heroes, will they turn a blind eye when those Islamists come calling for shelter and succor?
Notes
1. United States. National Intelligence Council. “A Note From the Chairman.” By John L. Helgerson. April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/nic/about_page/index.htm.>
2. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts" December 2000. April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/global_trends_2015.html.>
3. Ibid.
4. Bingen, R. James, ed., Democracy and Development in Mali, East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2000. p. 257.
5. Bingen, pg. 256.
6. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. “Mali.” April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.>
7. Kenny, Joseph, OP. Dominican Order. Province of Nigeria and Ghana. “Chapter 13: The Jihad States: 17th to 19th Centuries.” The Spread of Islam Through North to West Africa. <http://www.op.org/nigeriaop/kenny/NWAfr/a13.htm.>
8. Kenny.
9. The World Factbook. “Mali.”
10. The World Factbook. “Mali.”
11. The World Economic Forum’s East Asia Summit interrelates “the root causes of terrorism and enduring poverty.” World Economic Forum. “After 11 September, the Root Causes of Terrorism and Poverty Must Be Addressed.” World Economic Forum’s East Asia Economic Summit 2001. October 29, 2001. April 21, 2002. <http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/After+11+September,
+the+Root+Causes+of+Terrorism+and+Poverty+Must+Be+Addressed.>
The UN environment chief also believes that “the forces of poverty, environmental degradation and hatred … give birth to the intolerance that can lead to fundamentalism and terrorist acts. ”US Environment Chief: Fight Root Causes of Terrorism.” Environmental News Service. April 21, 2002. http://www.ens-news.com/ens/sep2001/2001L-09-21-02.html
At a speech at Georgetown University, Sen. Joe Lieberman related economic position to the development of terrorism. Tim Sullivan. “US Must Fight Terrorism’s Causes, Lieberman Says.” The Hoya. Tuesday, January 15 ,2002 <http://www.thehoya.com/news/011502/news2.cfm.>
12. A prime example of these loosely-demarcated bounderies is in the southern Arabian peninsula. Semi-nomadic peoples frequently cross the bounderies between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Much of the same occurs (under normal circumstances) among the Pashtuns on the Afghani-Pakistani frontier. Also Keita, p. 8. Also Zachariah, K. C., et al. Migration in West Africa: Demographic Aspects. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 1981. p. 3.
13. United Nations. UN Integrated Regional Information Networks. allAfrica.com. “Regional Efforts Against Child Trafficking.” January 21, 2002. April 9, 2002. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200201210319.html.>
14. Keita, Kalifa Keita, Lt. Col. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel. Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998. p. 6.
15. Keita, p. 8.
16. Keita, p. 12.
17. Keita, p. 13.
18. “Mali: Islamists begin election campaign with harsh criticism of Israel and the USA.” Narr. Joan Baxter. “Network Africa” radio program. BBC World Service. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/networkafrica. April 8, 2002.
Bibliography
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+the+Root+Causes+of+Terrorism+and+Poverty+Must+Be+Addressed.
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Prentice-Hall, 1986.
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Terrorism. Seattle: Bay Press, 1993.
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Helgerson. April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/nic/about_page/index.htm.>
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Service. April 21, 2002. <http://www.ens-news.com/ens/sep2001/2001L-09-21-02.html.>
Wellard, James. The Great Sahara. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1965.
Zachariah, K. C., et al. Migration in West Africa: Demographic Aspects. Oxford UK:
Oxford University Press, 1981.
by John M. Thomas, Jr.
May 2002
Americans recognize, especially since September 11, 2001, that the phenomenon of international terrorism is not to be confined to one corner or the world or another, altering the long-standing psychological denial by the American populace of the possibility of a substantial foreign terrorist attack on American soil. The prevention of future acts of terrorism, now a topic of much greater interest in the U.S., will be a multifaceted process which will includes the development of skills needed to predict where international terrorists might find safe harbor in the future. These “breeding grounds” of terrorism that have enabled transnational terrorists groups to thrive must be identified and acted upon to prevent the growth and development of terror spawned from these regions.
Many quarters bear watching, but how does one predict which areas will become a breeding ground for terrorism? The National Intelligence Council (NIC), a federal agency which serves as “a center for U.S. Government mid-term and long-term strategic thinking and for Intelligence Community collaboration on substantive issues,” has attempted to answer that question.1 In one of its recent publications, the NIC theorizes that “states with poor governance; ethnic, cultural, or religious tensions; weak economies; and porous borders will be prime breeding grounds for terrorism. In such states, domestic groups will challenge the entrenched government, and transnational networks [will seek] safehavens.”2 The NIC also believes that “the trend away from state-supported political terrorism and toward more diverse, free-wheeling, transnational networks—enabled by information technology—will continue.”3
These opinions of the NIC represent a synthesis of the thinking of many in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other U.S. government intelligence and intelligence-related agencies. As such, this four-pronged “theory of causes” (TOC) provides a point of departure for examining the likelihood of the genesis of terrorism in a given area. This paper will use the TOC to evaluate one such area, the Republic of Mali, and, in particular, will consider whether areas populated by the Tuareg in Northern Mali could be particularly vulnerable to an increased terrorist presence.
A few words of introduction are in order regarding the obscure state to be explored. The “Mali Federation” is a former French colony that gained its independence in 1960. At this time a federation consisting of Senegal and the present-day Republic of Mali was created. The Senegalese withdrew from the “Mali Federation” soon after independence, leaving the landlocked “Sudanese Republic,” which was soon to be renamed the Republic of Mali, to fend for itself.
The early years of the Republic of Mali were tumultuous. Mali’s second military dictator, Moussa Traore, was eventually elected to office under a functioning constitution. After years of severe drought while relying on agriculture as the prime element of the economy, Traore was overthrown in 1991, and a democratic constitution was ratified with a civilian presidency.
Mali’s north consists of desert and semi-desert, is sparsely populated, and is culturally much different than the south, which largely uses the Niger River as the basis for economic activity. Mali has a population near eleven million, possesses few natural resources, has a large debt, and has an economy that is very vulnerable to fluctuations in the world economy and demand for its primary export, cotton.
Applying the first criteria of the TOC (poor governance) to the Republic of Mali, several issues arise here regarding the strength of Malian state since it achieved independence from its colonial ruler. While Mali enjoys a high degree of democratic rule at the present time, the Republic has not always enjoyed such freedoms since decolonization and is subject to the winds of political fortune that frequently blow through the African continent, taking with them leaders and systems of government alike. Malian leaders, in the early days of independence, pandered to the interests of the Eastern Bloc in return for economic and military support, then within a few short years vacillated and sought Western help for their fledgling state. A mere Army lieutenant was able to effect the coup in 1968 that turned Mali more decisively to the West, underlining further the underdeveloped and vulnerable nature of the Malian political and military system at the time. Democratization can be said to have begun in Mali in earnest only more than two decades later in 1990, shortly before Traore was overthrown.4
Considering how recently democratic trends have taken root and developed in Mali, the permanence of such a change is questionable at best. Mali is still vulnerable to a return to one-party rule, which had previously brought brutal political oppression and more widespread corruption.5 The qualities of poor governance implied in the TOC would likely return under one-party rule, which would put the Republic of Mali at risk with respect to this criteria.
Secondly, the TOC mentions “ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions” as creating the necessary environment for the development of terrorist activity. At first glance, Mali scores high in the area of religious homogeneity, seemingly a major plus for stability in the evaluation of this criteria. Ninety percent of the population is Muslim, with the balance being practitioners of some form of native religion, as well as a few Christians.6
The Muslim population, however, deserves some scrutiny as to its sectarian nature both historically and presently. In the early half of the 20th century, the population of “French Soudan” became susceptible to a Sufi-like movement within Islam known as Hamallism. The movement consisted of “vassal tribes reacting against the Mauritanian Qâdiriyya and the Tukulor Tijâniyya orders which collaborated with the colonial power [France] and had a privileged position in society.”7 The Hamallists declared jihad against the colonial masters and their tribal partners and offered violent resistence,8 but the French soon left on their own accord, obviating the need for and effectively ending the movement. Violent religious doctrines which could facilitate terrorism have thus been developed in Mali in the past and certainly stand a chance for recurrence in the future.
Mali, like most sub-Saharan African states, is an amalgam of various ethnic and cultural groups vying for power and influence. Strictly speaking, nearly all African states south of the Sahara would fail this part of the second criteria of the TOC outright. Mali is no exception. The CIA Factbook cites eight easily identifiable ethnic groups, three of which are related but together still compose only about half of the population, leaving the other five groups to comprise forty-five percent of the population.9 This means, at any given time, at least four ethnic groups (or their representatives) are required to agree to form a majority. In Mali, like most African states, representative government can be fractured by ethnic disputes, risking the longevity of democratic government and the stability required for stopping the fulfillment of the previously discussed first criteria of the TOC (poor governance).
The principal example of ethnic and cultural tension in Mali involves the Tuareg people of the northern part of the country. This specific example will be entertained later in this paper at some length.
The third criteria of the TOC is a weak economy. Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world with sixty-five percent of its area desert or semidesert, a GDP per capita of US$850, and few natural resources.10 It would be difficult to argue that the citizens of the Republic of Mali are, by and large, well enough off to be invulnerable to the financial incentives that could come their way as a result of a growth in the presence of terrorists in Mali. The hard cash that a well-organized terrorist movement could bring into this country would make a substantial material difference in the quality of the lives of the collaborators.
Undesirable economic conditions can also raise the level of dissatisfaction with standard-of-living and prospects for the future. This dissatisfaction is believed by some to be a component in the development of militant fundamentalist Islam and other forms of thought that can engender terrorism.11 This discontent weighs as well in the previously discussed second criteria of the TOC (ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions), with economic circumstances exacerbating social unrest.
The fourth criteria of the TOC, the presence of porous borders around the state in question, lends itself to one very simple analysis. A great deal of Mali’s border lies across the sands of the Sahara. Demarcation of such boundaries is often merely a formality, given the relative absence of population and development in these areas. Nomadic peoples frequently criss-cross desert and steppe boundaries in various places around the world without government monitoring.12 Mali, indeed all Saharan states, do not have porous borders. They have open borders to those who are willing to brave the dangers of the desert.
The southern part of the country has its porous border features as well. Mali has been identified by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as one of the principal areas from which slaves are exported in Africa,13 indicating that persons frequently leave the country in an uncontrolled manner. This lack of effective border control is likely to extend not only to those leaving, but also to those entering.
Thus by a simple analysis using the criteria established by the NIC to evaluate geographical areas as future breeding grounds for terrorism, the Republic of Mali bears some attention. All four of the criteria of the TOC are satisfied in at least some basic way, especially the fourth with considerably porous borders conspicuously facilitating the traffic of humans both into and out of the country. Having established this positive analysis, at least two questions are begged. Is Mali more or less vulnerable to playing safe-haven to terrorists than comparable states in the region? Are there any areas of the Republic of Mali that may be more vulnerable than others to terrorist infiltration and development?
To comment on the first question, a lengthier comparative analysis would be more appropriate and is not within the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the nations of Mauritania, Niger, and Chad all share characteristics with Mali that would fit in various ways with the criteria of the TOC. Regionalizing the concerns brought from the analysis of the TOC for Mali would seem a prudent view and could yield useful information on the possible terrorist-support dynamics of the region as well as for each individual country.
The Tuareg are one of the indigenous peoples found in the northern desert and semidesert areas of Mali. Numbering over 600,000 in Mali alone, the Tuareg have been “the most substantial challenge to Mali’s stability since independence.”14 Culturally related to the Berbers, Tuaregs share a common language and ethnicity, but, much like the Somalis, have exhibited high degrees of intertribal and interclan rivalries. After warfare with the French during their colonization period, the Tuareg resisted assimilation into the colonies in favor of retaining their defiant nomadic lifestyle. This continued separation kept the Tuareg “outside the web of political relationships and material benefits of the new states.”15
The Tuareg rebelled against the Malian government on two occasions, in 1962 and 1990. The latter rebellion is of more interest in relationship to the TOC. Political institutions in northern Mali were weak due to the estrangement of the Tuareg from the rest of Malian society. Cultural tensions abounded due to the influx of Western ideas through electronic and written media and their effect on Tuareg society.16 Mali’s economy had been devastated by the African drought that began in 1985. Borders also remained porous to the nomadic Tuaregs. All principal elements of the TOC are qualified as early as the 1990 rebellion, facilitating the possible growth and development of terrorism.
In addition to these TOC qualifications, a direct linkage between the Tuareg and world terror can be found beginning around the time of the first rebellion. Malian Lt. Col. Kalifa Keita writes:
“ [ Muammar ] Qadhafi incorporated some Tuareg volunteers into his
regular military forces. Others, he inducted into a Libyan-sponsored
‘Islamic Legion’ from which he subsequently dispatched Islamic
militants to Lebanon, Palestine, and Afghanistan. By the mid 1980’s, some of
Qadhafi’s Tuareg volunteers had acquired considerable combat
experience in various conflicts of the Near East and South Asia.”17
Many of these “Islamic Legionnaires” returned shortly before the second rebellion and contributed their skills and experience to the insurrection.
Given the satisfaction of several elements of the TOC specifically by the Tuareg occupied areas of northern Mali as well as the presence of elements of Qahhafi’s former army in this region, it stands to reason that northern Mali may prove to be more problematic than other parts of the state with respect to fostering terrorism. The reclusive “Blue Men of the Veil,” as the Tuaregs are often called, fanatical Muslims with easy access to only nominal borders and the inclination to resist central authority, may well find themselves in a crossroads of nascent terror.
As may the state of Mali as a whole, as current events quickly have elucidated. On April 8, 2002, thousands of Malians took to the streets to decry America and Israel for their policies in Palestine. American anti-terrorist operations around the world were denounced, and religious leaders issued religious curses on American leaders for their perceived anti-Islamic prejudices. Political leaders promised to influence Mali’s fledgling electoral process by attempting to get elected as many Islamists to political office as possible.18
The future of the Republic of Mali is fraught with many questions, including those of an economic, political, and social nature. All three of these areas of concern relate directly to the possible future present of terrorist activity and its ability to thrive in the region. This analysis illustrates some basic ways in which Mali may be vulnerable to the disease of terrorism. While Malians rally against America and give verbal support to their radical militant Islamist heroes, will they turn a blind eye when those Islamists come calling for shelter and succor?
Notes
1. United States. National Intelligence Council. “A Note From the Chairman.” By John L. Helgerson. April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/nic/about_page/index.htm.>
2. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts" December 2000. April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/global_trends_2015.html.>
3. Ibid.
4. Bingen, R. James, ed., Democracy and Development in Mali, East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2000. p. 257.
5. Bingen, pg. 256.
6. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. “Mali.” April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.>
7. Kenny, Joseph, OP. Dominican Order. Province of Nigeria and Ghana. “Chapter 13: The Jihad States: 17th to 19th Centuries.” The Spread of Islam Through North to West Africa. <http://www.op.org/nigeriaop/kenny/NWAfr/a13.htm.>
8. Kenny.
9. The World Factbook. “Mali.”
10. The World Factbook. “Mali.”
11. The World Economic Forum’s East Asia Summit interrelates “the root causes of terrorism and enduring poverty.” World Economic Forum. “After 11 September, the Root Causes of Terrorism and Poverty Must Be Addressed.” World Economic Forum’s East Asia Economic Summit 2001. October 29, 2001. April 21, 2002. <http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/After+11+September,
+the+Root+Causes+of+Terrorism+and+Poverty+Must+Be+Addressed.>
The UN environment chief also believes that “the forces of poverty, environmental degradation and hatred … give birth to the intolerance that can lead to fundamentalism and terrorist acts. ”US Environment Chief: Fight Root Causes of Terrorism.” Environmental News Service. April 21, 2002. http://www.ens-news.com/ens/sep2001/2001L-09-21-02.html
At a speech at Georgetown University, Sen. Joe Lieberman related economic position to the development of terrorism. Tim Sullivan. “US Must Fight Terrorism’s Causes, Lieberman Says.” The Hoya. Tuesday, January 15 ,2002 <http://www.thehoya.com/news/011502/news2.cfm.>
12. A prime example of these loosely-demarcated bounderies is in the southern Arabian peninsula. Semi-nomadic peoples frequently cross the bounderies between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Much of the same occurs (under normal circumstances) among the Pashtuns on the Afghani-Pakistani frontier. Also Keita, p. 8. Also Zachariah, K. C., et al. Migration in West Africa: Demographic Aspects. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 1981. p. 3.
13. United Nations. UN Integrated Regional Information Networks. allAfrica.com. “Regional Efforts Against Child Trafficking.” January 21, 2002. April 9, 2002. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200201210319.html.>
14. Keita, Kalifa Keita, Lt. Col. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel. Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998. p. 6.
15. Keita, p. 8.
16. Keita, p. 12.
17. Keita, p. 13.
18. “Mali: Islamists begin election campaign with harsh criticism of Israel and the USA.” Narr. Joan Baxter. “Network Africa” radio program. BBC World Service. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/networkafrica. April 8, 2002.
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posted by John M. Thomas, Jr. @ 9/17/2005 12:24:00 PM
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