Papers

Monday, October 27, 2014

ISIS should not be underestimated at Baghdad



If there is one thing we have learned about the ongoing conflict in southwest Asia with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), it would be that the group has consistently overcome flippant designations such as being termed “the J-V squad.”  ISIS had outpaced nearly all predictions of having only limited possibilities for successful actions, particularly in terms of territorial acquisitions, and the same psychology is prevailing in the American and Western military appraisals of the potential of ISIS to secure points in and around Baghdad.

One of the most crucial of these locales is the international airport that services Baghdad and that is located in its suburbs.  Recently, ISIS forces, with the conquest of Abu Ghraib, have closed to within eight miles of Baghdad International Airport, a mere hop-skip-and-jump to the core aviation and supply facility that keeps Baghdad defensible by providing a constant source of war materiel, food, potable water, and many other commodities which make the veritable desert outpost workable as a city and military presence.

Yet military authorities in both Iraq and the West still denigrate the potential of ISIS to pose a credible threat against the airport, echoing previous underestimations of the terrorist army that has swept sixty-percent of Iraq’s territory and a large part of the Syrian geography.  The specifics that characterize the overall advance of ISIS argue for the possibility of the airport succumbing to the ISIS threat.

Anbar, a province of Iraq that abuts the administrative district in which Baghdad is located, has mostly been taken by storm by the Islamic State. These victories include taking the city of Fallujah, which bears much American blood as a result of one of the most contentious conflicts fought by our troops in the Iraq war.  Only a few holdouts against the terrorist wave have been achieved in Anbar, including the defense of the resilient city of Ramadi (which barely holds on to half of the jurisdiction), but, by and large, Iraqi population centers and military facilities  have fallen hard to the black flag of ISIS throughout Anbar province.

Now the ISIS terror machine has secured eighty-percent or more of the mostly desert Anbar province and has used that conquest to make a slow and methodical approach to Baghdad airport, holding many key areas around that facility.  The forces of ISIS and Iraq stand behind berms only a few miles away from one another and lob mortar shots back and forth in a sadistic, random game of selective, occasional slaughter.

What is this magical property that the Iraqi army now possesses that will inhibit further defeats at the hand of ISIS?  Experts cite the sheer number of Iraqi troops in the Baghdad area at 100,000 strong, with some as “fiercely loyal,” and that the aerial capacities of the allied presence make a ground approach to Baghdad improbable and ultimately unsuccessful.

As improbable and ultimately unsuccessful as ISIS has been predicted to be all along?

There is a real possibility that a greater concentration of ISIS forces could be achieved at Baghdad airport once the siege of the Kurdish city of Kobani is completed or abandoned.  If ISIS can muster 10,000 or some other large number of fighters at the periphery of Baghdad airport, the terrorists may attack the facility.  Although government troops may outnumber the attackers, many Iraqi soldiers in the past have fled, deserted, and generally panicked at the prospect of being captured and beheaded by ISIS forces, so you can count on some attrition if there is an assault.

Although the government may be favored in such a battle, there are too many intangibles that ISIS brings to the battlefield for conventional military wisdom to always apply.  Quite simply, regardless of the numbers of combatants and the adequacy of the defenses, ISIS could prevail in isolated instances near and at the Baghdad airport, which could lead to a cascading failure of the overall defense of the installation, partly due to terror inspired in the hearts and minds of the defenders, a development which would typify the military record of ISIS this year.

Should the airport fall, ISIS would be at the doorstep of Baghdad and in much closer mortar-range of large parts of the city.  The psychological dimension of bombs falling into the city proper would take a considerable toll on morale and confidence of all allied forces.  But this is not the worst outcome.

ISIS has secured three fighter aircraft that they may not be able to operate at full capacity.  ISIS may, however, be able to enable the basic functioning of the aircraft enough to fly (possibly under radar) into the Baghdad city defenses to perforate the security of the city.  Through the utter confusion and disarray such an attack might cause, small, individual groups of ISIS fighters might penetrate imperfections in the city’s military perimeter.

So what?  A band of a few brigands could only kill a few people before being stopped, right?  At most, it seems, there could be a few dozen casualties from some sort of suicidal bombing, and the group would be stopped.  As unfortunate as that would be, it would not lead to the fall of Baghdad, right?

But what if the penetrating group is carrying a radiological dispersion device – a “dirty bomb” – and that device is somehow delivered at the Green Zone, the nerve center of Iraqi and allied military and governmental activity.  The Green Zone becomes uninhabitable, some degree of chaos ensues, command and control functions could deteriorate, and the siege of Baghdad could conceivably become successful.

This is an unlikely turn of events, but is by no means is an impossibility.  It is entirely possible that ISIS has secured some radiologically-active material that could be exploded to create a zone of intense radioactivity.  It could well be smuggled in even if a penetration of the defensive perimeter of Baghdad is not damaged.  Certainly if that line of defense was thrown into confusion, the chances of a team delivering the “dirty bomb” would be enhanced.  With the added spoiler of three stolen aircraft flown by ISIS into the crux of the situation, there are no guarantees that the absolute, impenetrable defense of Baghdad could be maintained.


So when you are having your morning coffee and a “talking head” tells you how safe Baghdad is, remember how safe other Iraqi bases and cities were thought to be six months ago.  Enjoy the cup of joe you are having that morning and savor the feeling of peacetime in America.  If the 10,000 Americans stationed and working in Baghdad are poisoned or killed by a “dirty bomb,” even Mr. Obama will have to answer an undeniably clear and present danger with military force, and our days of relative peace will be over. ~~~

Monday, September 08, 2014

St. Luke's Lutheran Church

St. Luke’s Lutheran Church
by John M. Thomas, Jr.
September 8th, 2014
For the Summerville Journal-Scene (before editing)


                St. Luke’s Lutheran Church in Summerville was founded in 1892 by Lutheran merchants who summered in the future Flowertown for reasons related to escaping malaria along the coast just as many have done over the centuries in the early days of the Charleston area.  When chartered, St. Luke’s was a “preaching station” with itinerant clergy who conducted monthly or twice-monthly services.
In 1882, many of these merchants moved into Summerville on a permanent basis, helping to found the “downtown district” with the creation of various dry-goods stores. Until 1921, St. Luke’s was affiliated with St. Barnabas in downtown Charleston, at which time the mission was converted to a full-fledged church by the ecclesiastical authorities, shortly after the beginning of the presence of a full-time pastor for the group in 1917.
Today, St. Luke’s stands as a pillar for the Christian community in Summerville, espousing several important community programs the prominently place the church on the map for a strong service mission.    The child care center at St. Luke’s has been in operation for over forty years, and the very well-developed Alzheimer’s support ministry offers respite care to spell the caretakers of these patients, giving the family and friends of the ill members of the community a chance to “take a break” and enjoy other activities for a few hours.
In 2013, the Alzheimer’s ministry served 1468 unique clients and provided 7390 volunteer hours to perform this mission.  Family members of the patients are cared for by the ministry through social outreach above and beyond the respite care provided.  The work at St. Luke’s has led to another ministry being formed called “NOAH,” which is designed to foster the development of respite care services in nearby rural areas.
St. Luke’s has been a nursery for the development of these and other social ministry programs in the Summerville area, including a strong ministry for those who must cope with the death or miscarriage of a child.  The church is said by its members to be the kind of place where outreach is a highly integral and important part of church life, which is attested to the steady growth of the Alzheimer’s respite care ministry over the years.

Steeped in the venerable traditions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the parishioners at St. Luke’s share a strong bond of faith and service, and the church is a strong asset for the Summerville community, both in terms of providing religious foundation as well as serving as a bulwark against several social problems in a determined and highly productive manner. 

Wednesday, April 30, 2014

Review of Danahar's The New Middle East

Danahar, Paul.  The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring.  New York City: Bloomsbury Press, 2013.  468 pages.

Book review by John M. Thomas, Jr., MA. Thomas graduated with distinction in social science from The Citadel (Military College of South Carolina) in 2012 and currently works as a journalist for The Summerville Journal-Scene and as an independent scholar in the Charleston, South Carolina area in the United States.

Paul Danahar’s The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring is an exceptional account of the experiences, research, and journalistic writings of a prominent BBC Middle Eastern bureau chief written shortly after his tenure as head of the news agency office at the time of the ‘Arab Spring.’  Danahar’s very well written book is filled with detail that brings one into the mindset of the Middle Eastern milieu in an informed and highly elucidating manner.  From 2010 until 2013, Danahar lead the effort at the BBC to cover the tumultuous and historic events that transpired in many states across North Africa, the Levant, and those on the shores of the Persian Gulf.  These events, part of the still-unconcluded chaos ignited by a sole self-immolation in Tunisia, are explained with a fitting historical and cultural context that weaves the story of the progression of recent Middle Eastern history into a fascinating work.
  Danahar leaves few stones unturned in achieving this synoptic book, especially for those new to Middle Eastern studies or politics or for those in need of an update focused on the developing facets of the political struggles of the region.  Scholars will find the book useful as supporting material to monographs written on the subject of the Arab Spring, as Danahar places a great deal of emphasis on actual interpersonal occurrences and clear and concise treatment of the Middle Eastern environment.
A large portion of the text is devoted to ‘the Arab Spring’ in Egypt, the state which has developed into the ‘center-of-gravity’ in this unfolding story, both in terms of the size of affected population as well as the overall degree of tumult in the country.  Hosni Mubarak’s fall and the eventual succession of the Muslim Brotherhood is described by Danahar to be fraught with the difficulties associated with the diametrically opposing factions, one Islamist and the other more secular, whose interactions lead to the “long war” in Egypt.  The book also details the treatment of the various Palestinian populations, challenges caused by Israel, the surrounding states, and the various Palestinian leaderships, all of which effect Israel.  The book also explores past and recent developments in Iraq, Syria, and Libya that are equally as excruciating as the Egyptian and Levantine problems.
 Danahar rounds out his spectrum of journalistic analysis with a brief historical chapter entitled “The Collapse of the Old Middle East,” which highlights continuing issues that contribute to the current state of affairs in the region.  Long-lived governments under leaders like Muammar Gaddafi and the Shah of Iran are explained in perspective, and the government and politics of Tunisia is explained in terms of how the history of the country led it to the point of producing the genesis of the ‘Arab Spring.’ The author also gives a rather distressing overview of, what Danahar argues, is the grossly inadequate American foreign policy which has been implemented in the region.  Danahar posits this generally mishandled and ill-informed approach by America as dating back to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War which was followed in 1924 by the secularist Mustafa Kemal Ataturk becoming the first President of what is now modern-day Turkey.  Much of the Middle East was left to flounder with arbitrarily drawn borders that did not create viable nation-states and have been largely dysfunctional politically, economically, and in terms of cultural and religious interactions among people living in these countries.
The overall elucidating effect of the book is achieved by Danahar’s meticulous journalistic research and participation in the events which shook the Middle East, including his interactions with some of the principal Middle Eastern figures both past and present, which adds a significant personal touch to the work.  Danahar met with Bashar al-Assad at his presidential palace in Damascus and relates details of the personality of the Alawite dictator as being more appropriate to “the mild mannered ophthalmologist he had trained to be,” which stands in complete opposition to his bloodthirsty repression of the Syrian people starting long before the Arab Spring began.
Danahar also had the chance to meet with Gaddafi in “a seaside restaurant in downtown Tripoli” in 2011 while Libya was in the throes of revolution.  The regime had at that time lost the east of the country, all the while the eccentric Libyan dictator living in a tent near Tripoli and claiming a distaste for money.  There are many passages in the book where the idiosyncrasies of the various leaders and dictators in the Middle East are discussed, either from first-hand, verbally-related, or documentary information.  The texture of the work is created in part by these high-level encounters, a testament to Danahar’s journalistic gravitas in the region and in the world of professional media in general.
  The ideological bent of The New Middle East, focused on Danahar’s own moderately liberal perspective, is an appropriate lens through which to view the events of the ‘Arab Spring,’ The author sees the Middle East as a relic from Ottoman days that has much of the decay of that empire having never been surmounted since the Sykes-Picot partition of the region.  Danahar sees the Middle East for what it could be from a hopeful Western perspective, all the while seeing the realities of the situation on the ground there as harsh and bitter.  Danahar’s perspective does not, however,  represent the only perspective on the ongoing revolutions in the Middle East, and many conservative scholars would take exception to some of the conclusions and analysis of various types of information presented.
The scrutiny placed by Danahar on issues within the Levant is gritty, brutally honest, and representative of the preponderance of sheer and unmitigated frustration with the enormous depth of the seemingly irreconcilable problems inherent to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The cultures and political contributions of both groups relevant to the current situation within the hotly-contested regions of Israel and the Palestinian territories are explained in clear and extensive detail.
The full spectrum of religious and political participation in modern Israel is also surveyed carefully and with much precision. Particular attention is given to the ultra-rightist groups in Israel, such as the Haredi and other Orthodox Jewish factions whose uncompromising and stringently anachronistic views effectively prevent Israel from having the flexibility to negotiate settlements and agreements due to the ‘hard right turn’ that such a segment in society brings about in Israel.  The more secular Israeli Jews also have their societal demands and own interpretation of what the state of Israel should be, complicating an already intractable morass even further into irreconcilability.
The reader is left with the rather dreary impression of the futility which all sides involved experience with respect to the unfolding political and social condition of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  The spectrum of accommodation, argues Danahar, cannot be extended long enough to accommodate all interest groups in the general political equation which composes the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  Hard feelings and difficult history since the unilateral declaration of the founding of the state of Israel in 1948 have accumulated over the years, creating an inertia which cannot be mitigated thoroughly by any form of diplomacy that has been attempted during the duration of the conflict.  Such is the story told by Danahar, a discouraging but probably accurate indication of the more difficult days to come in the Levant, next door to the Syrian civil war, which rages along with the ISIS-spawned conflict in Iraq to this day.

The hard-hitting style and content of Danahar’s book, The New Middle East, makes it a key work for those interested in the ‘Arab Spring,’ and the book should be used in future analysis of the situation on the ground as a primary resource.  The basis of the work, rooted in Danahar’s outstanding brand of journalism, should be coupled with scholarly material to provide a strong, palpable presentation of the true consistency of the current state of affairs in the Middle East, as witnessed by those on the ground who are having to live through the implications of the various revolutions and their eventual outcomes.

Saturday, April 05, 2014

Political Participation of the Homeless

This paper was written for a class taught by Janet Key in the nonprofit administration program at the College of Charleston in December of 2012.


Political Participation of the Homeless
The plight of the homeless in the United States has been one of frustration and disenchantment and is largely characterized by dissociation of this community from the mainstream of society.  The various institutional structures that have been put into place to assist the homeless, including nonprofit organizations,  have brought about a myriad of  results.  Many of these outcomes have not been effective as solutions to the problems at hand.  Nonprofits involved with the homelessness debacle are continually frustrated and continue to be unable to arrive at satisfactory resolutions to these issues here in the United States, the wealthiest country in the world.
One of the primary conceptual difficulties of dealing with the homelessness problem lies in the apparent inability of experts and other interested parties to define the phenomenon with any level of confidence or satisfaction.  If the problem cannot be defined, it is difficult to determine a solution for lack of a satisfactory “starting point” for the complex sociological analysis needed to begin to unravel the causation components.  The situation is somewhat analogous to trying to effectively solve a quantitative mathematics problem without the necessary starting values of the variables in a given equation.  The mathematician in question might know something about the mechanics of the problem but be entirely unable to produce a satisfactory solution due to insufficient information.
Attempts to define homelessness have been made by scholars and organizations, including by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which has identified four broad categories of homeless persons which may effectively encompass a large portion of this community: 1) those who live in places not meant for human habitation, 2) people who do not have a nighttime residence, 3) families or youth with unstable housing situations, 4) those who are fleeing the violent behavior of others that has been directed against them (National Alliance to End Homelessness, 2012).  Yet even here we are delineating the visible results of the homelessness problem; our view of these situations does not include a core cause of the plight of the homeless and only lends itself to a partial illustration of all aspects of the problem.
Nevertheless, we can proceed with a tentative and non-empirical conception of what homelessness is based on the above HUD definitions.  Arising from the demarcation of these four groups are several possible avenues for analysis, including the explication of numerous political factors that are contributive to the condition of homelessness.  The politics surrounding the various actors in the homelessness milieu are a substantial piece of the puzzle that must be assembled in order to understand some of the quandary at hand.
Perhaps the most troubling of these political factors has to do with the “political will” of all the non-homeless actors visible in the homelessness panorama.  In other words, why, in a nation as wealthy as the United States of America, do the institutions, organizations, governments, and businesses of this country allow the problem to exist at all in any form?  Financial capital seems to be the key to solving a great deal of the homelessness problem, at least as it relates strictly to making housing and shelter available and usable to everyone who needs it.
Simply put, even though the amount of financial investment to simply put a roof over the head of each homeless person would be a minimal part of overall governmental outlay, politicians stay away from the issue of housing the homeless due to the powerlessness and political inertness of the affected population.  Politicians can avoid servicing the homeless population in general due to negligible electoral consequences stemming from this highly indigent and unregistered population, altering the political landscape substantially against the homeless.
Compassion is apparently eschewed in acts of apparently cold legislative fiat concurrent with a void of political services for the transient homeless population.  Although there may be occasional exceptions, the political world is largely inaccessible to homeless persons.  This, along with vacuum of accountability, leaves the homeless largely bereft of more powerful forms of political advocacy.
But the “shutting out” of the homeless from access to political power structures is not the only political issue at hand.  Even when an interest is taken by a politician in the homeless, usually the first instinct of the official is to “hand off” the problem to a much less well-funded nonprofit community (Daly, 1996, p.192).  Politicians may not be able to sell homelessness remedies to typical constituents who are in possession of housing (Daly, 1996, p.39).  These constituents may regard the housing situation of the homeless as being due to factors controllable by the homeless rather than being characterized by a victimology related to various social, financial, health, or other issues.  In this sense, the homeless are seen by many as being completely responsible for the genesis of their situation and should not receive a “bail-out” or other assistance (Wagner, 2012, p.17).  Indeed, in some jurisdictions, homelessness and concurrent activities were made increasingly illegal, particularly in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s in California and New York City. Adding insult to injury, the homeless were persecuted during this time period much as they have been, although sometimes intermittently, throughout the course of the modern era (Wagner, 2012, pp. 121-131). 
Since the expense of solving the salient housing issues involved with homelessness may not be an item which can be appended to the agenda of all of voting citizens and thus some politicians, the nonprofit community is largely left on its own to attempt to surmount the homelessness issue.  Public funding, particularly from local governments, is substantially less in this scenario than in a conceptualization of a predominantly civilly-funded and -administered solution, a circumstance which is not often if ever achieved in the United States.  Public and private donations to various forms of homeless care-providers have also substantially decreased during the economic downturn in the United States that began in 2008 and persists in some form at the time of the writing of this paper (Fang, 2009, p.18).
Faced with these substantial budget cuts, the economic downturn has reduced services in nearly all non-profit arenas, including among homeless care-providers.  As well, the downturn initialized in 2008 has increased demand for shelter and other services substantially as new homeless have been created by the shifting sands of the American financial system and the runaway malevolent effects of gross mismanagement of that system.  Already overworked nonprofits have had additional demands placed on them as a result of the recent financial chaos and struggle from a place of attempting to fulfill a mission largely abrogated by the government, which also has its financial difficulties at the risk of gross understatement.
 “Occupy Wall Street” and subsequent demonstrations have grown in part out of this dilemma (Ehrenreich, 2011).  Nearly every economic interest, including individuals and families, has been pushed further toward the margins, and some of these financial actors have been pushed into insolvency, which can cause an increase in the rate of homelessness in the general population.
Further dislocated from the assets that facilitate modern life, the homeless have become more distant from political loci of power.  As has been mentioned earlier in this paper, the homeless lack electoral voice in general.  The mechanisms for this disenfranchisement are often as simple as lacking a permanent address which to offer for voting registration.  While jurisdictions have increasingly allowed homeless shelter addresses to be used on government and other official documents, still there are barriers to registration and voting as simple as unavailable or limited transportation to government offices and polls, illiteracy affecting both the administrative prerequisites to voting, the actual casting of ballots, and the generally inferior state of health of the homeless decreasing their turnout on election days (Levinson, 2009, p.280). 
Actions of political parties and nonprofits have increased homeless participation in the voting process in recent years, particularly through the work of Democratic and liberal-leaning groups (Levinson, 2009, p. 309). Yet it is hard to imagine that the homeless population receives the same amount of political attention per capita as the suburban or wealthy urban populations do individually or through corporations.  The recent case of Citizens United vs. FEC  heard and ruled on by the US Supreme Court in 2010 strongly facilitates the virtually unlimited amount of wealth that can be poured into politics by those of means, effectively dwarfing the indigent person or the hourly worker and further entrenching a plutocracy that is strongly contrary to the interests of the homeless and their recovery from a highly disadvantaged situation. 
Other political difficulties that the homeless may experience include a considerably compromised ability to stand for office.  It is easily observable that campaign funds would not be easily forthcoming to someone without any geographical establishment whatsoever.  Equally daunting would be the production of a “political image” given cosmetic and nutritional constraints as well as the modification of personal physical appearance brought about by the continual stress of being homeless.  Over time, the often emaciated and disheveled appearance of the homeless would act against gaining political strength through image production, a crucial element for securing public office in the United States. 
The advancement of personal knowledge necessary to be a “political player” is also considerably more difficult without a base of operations or the funds to enable continued gathering of such information.  The homeless are frequently more educated and intelligent than the average citizen might think, but it is the compromised ability to accrue knowledge in the homeless condition due to critical distractions related to material state of being that would tend not to inform political ability and knowledge.
Other such political disadvantages exist, including proximity of the homeless to many of the illegal activities associated with “the street” disrupting any campaign or civic political efforts; difficulties of politically-oriented nonprofits in contacting homeless persons to develop their participation given the general lack of a location to solicit during the day; and the inability or difficulty in accessing the text of state and federal law and records of public and current affairs, except possibly in public libraries where the homeless may or may not be welcome.
This analysis of how politics affects the homeless and the nonprofits that attempt to benefit them cannot be completed in a paper of this length.  As long as individuals have political imperatives, they will be expressed, whether it be at the highest or lowest tiers of American society.  The issue becomes problematic when the nonprofits that attempt to facilitate the lives of the homeless are not financially or structurally empowered to bring realistic levels of political participation to the affected population.
Whatever a person’s plight might be in our society, the human voice should not be silenced by the circumstances of homelessness.  The interaction of the homeless with the political forces that affect them is a “two-way street”; the homeless should be empowered to affect the system so that structural changes can be made not only by institutions but also by homeless and formerly-homeless persons.  The real-life experience that potential leaders from the homeless population possess can be exploited to lead to better solutions to the homeless problem and to better ways for the homeless to interact politically with their environment.

The beginning of the preamble of the Constitution of the United States of America reads: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . .” (1787).  The inexorable conclusion of these statements is that the rights of a homeless person are identical to the rights of a person with a home.  There is no leeway to remove homeless persons from the political mainstream or for them to be treated differently politically due to plutocratic or elitist influences.  Principles of social justice must be applied to facilitate the constitutional equality of the homeless population to be in compliance with the bedrock of our public sphere, our remarkable constitution, without regard for their current circumstances.  The empowerment of the homeless toward political action will certainly speed the end to this great shame of our great nation.

The author is a former board member of two homeless shelters in the Charleston, South Carolina metropolitan area, the Good Neighbor Center and Palmetto House, serving in both capacities in the early and mid-1990's.

Wednesday, March 19, 2014

Summerville Presbyterian Church

Churches in communities as established as Summerville, South Carolina, always have some history, with some congregations more rooted in the past than others.  Many congregations have a deep sense of connection to national or international overarching groups or denominations of which they are a part.  Summerville’s houses of worship are no exception, and, in terms of historical significance, several of the local churches are considerably important to the local, state, and ecclesiastical history of this area. 
Summerville Presbyterian Church (SPC) is probably the most prominent of the local Summerville churches in terms of colonial and post-colonial roots.  In the late 17th-century, there arrived in Dorchester, Massachusetts, a group of English Protestants who strongly believed in the local governance of their churches rather than the overarching administration of the Church of England.  The group decided to move south and carried the name Dorchester with them, which also in time became the name of the county.  In 1696, the first “meeting house” was built by the future Presbyterian congregation at the township of Dorchester.  Due to English law, the group could not be formally constituted as a church because their denomination was not Anglican.
The departure of the British Crown after the Revolutionary War made it possible for this congregational group to constitute as a “church,” and much of the religious intolerance imported into the Lowcountry from Europe would become dampened after the British exit.  The free practice of religion would become much easier for many Protestants here and in America in general by the 1780’s, including for the future SPC.
Eventually, in 1831, after a colorful history that includes a burning by the British and an attempted rebuilding of the “White Meeting House” and the entire town of Dorchester, a church building was erected in Summerville to accommodate members of the group living nearer to “Flowertown” than Dorchester.  The Summerville structure was also used for those who found it favorable to attend a certain location based on the seasons.  Summerville prospered as did the church that would eventually be known as Summerville Presbyterian Church.
SPC and many local Summerville churches have enjoyed great success since some of the greater calamities like the Civil War and the earthquake of 1886 have passed.  Dr. Mike Shelton, current minister of the church, confirms that prosperity and tolerance have been the rule for SPC and other churches in Summerville, and that the sort of antipathy among religious factions that was in evidence during colonial times is not a common part of the experience of his parishioners today.  Churches in the Summerville locale frequently cooperate and concelebrate their holidays and other events, creating a sense of warmth and fellowship that is shared by few if any other communities.
This collegial spirit might not exist without SPC and other pioneer churches “having stuck it out” in the early years, resisting the colonial yoke, and starting a rudimentary ecumenical process after the defeat of the British Empire.  The parishioners at Summerville Presbyterian Church should be greatly credited for living their chosen way, having fought hard to maintain the existence of their church and blazing a trail for the groups that would follow in the Summerville area.  By the friendly reception this writer received at SPC, all should drop by for their services and events.  You might learn something about history!

A version of this article was published in the Summerville Journal-Scene on Thursday, March 6th, 2014.

Sunday, April 13, 2008

Factors Contributing to the Development of the Christian East-West Schism Usually Denoted by the Year 1054

Factors Contributing to
The Development of the
Christian East-West Schism
Usually Denoted by the Year 1054

Byzantine History
Dr. Jane Bishop
The Citadel
22 Jan 06
by
John M. Thomas, Jr.

The “Schism of 1054” has been seminal in defining the administrative structure of and delineating lines of authority over a very large part of the Christian Church since the 11th-century, creating and to some extent legitimizing two loci of ecclesiastical power in Rome and Constantinople. However, this schismatic event was not as well-defined temporally as the placement of the date “1054” might lead one to believe. The schism between the primary Christian churches of the Eastern and the Western Mediterranean regions has its roots in several important events, trends, and historical developments, including the unilateral institution of the filioque into the Western Church’s creed by Roman pontiffs. This schism, the main medieval cleavage within the body of the Christian Church, which is often said to have been caused by events in the year 1054, was certainly more of a development achieved over time rather than a single schismatic incident. This event precipitated a break in the body of the Christian Church which has not been repaired in the almost ten centuries since the traditional date of occurrence of the schism.

To synopsize the confrontational event of 1054, which is often ascribed to be the culminating point of the East-West divergence, Latin and Greek Christian leaders during the papacy of Leo IX attempted a dialogue in an effort to settle some disputes. These differences of opinion and practice included quarrels over doctrine, such as the disagreement over the appropriate disposition of the aforementioned Filioque, as well as over contentious issues involved with church business, such as whether Latin-Rite churches should be reopened in Constantinople. Largely due to the personality conflicts among the people involved, including squabbles between Michael Cerularius, Patriarch of Constantinople, and the French cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, Leo’s legate, the representatives of the Greek and Latin churches excommunicated each other, abandoning all ecclesiastical restraint in favor of punitive measures.

This row was based more on idiosyncratic and personal issues rather than seriously doctrinal problems, which kept the conflict out of the realms of the most serious heresy considerations and accusations, at least by modern standards.1 The participants in the schismatic event of 1054 offered strong opinions that there were substantive issues on which Rome and Constantinople differed that were important enough to embroil the respective churches in an open conflict, but, in modern retrospect, those issues seem mostly trivial.2 The excommunications delivered in the year 1054 were originally intended to be understood on a personal level among the disputants involved with the interactions between Cerularius and Humbert. These vitriolic conflicts unfortunately did, over time, however, mostly as a result of the Crusades and the Fourth Crusade in particular, come to be interpreted as having a broader meaning. The implication of the excommunications widened to include the entirety of the Christian communities represented by the Greek and Latin prelates who were involved in this fracas of 1054, much to the eventual misfortune of those communities, particularly the Byzantine Empire.3

The aforementioned incident of 1054 deserves analysis mostly in the sense that it is an example of how oppositional personalities and the conflicts that erupt from the clashes between those personalities have affected the conduct of medieval politics and church business. Certainly personality conflicts motivate much of what history is about, but when examining the changing religious habits of entire nations of peoples, more is often at issue than just hard feelings between leaders. The tantrum-like excommunications by the camps of Cerularius and Humbert were largely considered mere technicalities for decades, maybe longer, by most medieval Eastern and Western citizens, if they had even heard about the conflict (most probably hadn’t in the 11th-century, and certainly few had details).4 Attention should be instead drawn to the overarching socioreligious themes which were pulling the two Christian communities apart over several centuries and which represent the true course of events leading to the estrangement of Eastern and Western Christianity. This dichotomy has essentially led to the distinction of two different religious movements, Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, with an overlapping, partially shared history.

The separate and contrasting theological and church-related dynamics of East and West had been well-established and well-defined before 1054. As far as the interactions of the Roman and Constantinopolitan churches are concerned, there had been quite a few outstanding incidents since the early days of the Church that had caused “a line in the sand” to be drawn. Perhaps the first major incidents revolved around the heresies of Arius, which created much of the early dynamic evidenced in the East regarding the consideration of alternative theological positions. The vigorous, educated approach to confronting and elucidating heresy in the East was in stark contrast to a West that truly had not the luxury of time and energy to devote to theological speculation (due to the distractions caused by the Germanic invasions particularly).

Neither did many in the West have the appropriate education to rightly ponder and analyze the Arian heresy and later theological disputes in as detailed and introspective a way as their Eastern counterparts.5 This disparity in intellectual capital created quite a distinction between the East and West, guaranteeing two widely divergent Christian religious cultures in the Mediterranean region drawn along geographical lines. These demarcations insured different sorts of reactions from this pair of widely variant intellectual and religious worldviews, each having its own traditions and priorities.6

Further problems that affected interactions between East and West erupted over the Byzantine Patriarchate of John Chrysostom, followed by the Acacian Schism over the Henotikon, with both of these events occurring in a time much earlier in church history than the 11th-century. Also early on and perhaps more importantly, several Eastern patriarchates and their peoples migrated toward monophysitism, a theological position which has been said by some theologians to have never been abandoned by the Oriental Orthodox who have chosen that theology.  Some religious scholars believe that the protests of the Oriental Orthodox objecting to this designation are questionable.7 Monophysites believe that Christ had only a divine nature, even when He lived on earth in human form, which contrasts with the orthodox view that Christ was at once fully human and fully divine. The monophysite controversy left Westerners thinking in terms of monophysitism being an Eastern phenomenon, one that somewhat characterized the religious climate of the East, which, for the most part and when considered over the entire Eastern Mediterranean, would have been a mischaracterization.

The iconoclasm controversy also created a sharp division between the East and the West, since much of the East, having been initiated into the cult of iconoclasm by the actions of Byzantine emperor Leo III in the 8th-century, embraced further iconoclastic thinking during the later contentious periods of the iconoclasm controversy. In contrast, the Latin West generally had no problems with religious pictures and often considered such pictures valid teaching tools, especially for the illiterate masses. As a result, the fire of iconoclasm burned less brightly in the West, leaving another sharply contrasting pair of early religious experiences for each region and further separating the two camps in their spiritual leanings through the particular mechanism of the iconoclasm controversy, as well as the aforementioned monophysitic controversy.

The events surrounding the Photian Schism, which is rooted in the appointment of Ignatius as Patriarch of Constantinople in 847 and lasted until the resignation of Photius from that same office in 886, served to show certain cleavages between the Eastern Church and the Western Church. The Pope’s ability to control episcopal appointments was shown by the Photian Schism to be limited with respect to the office of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. As well the Pope could not stop the consecration of a bishop which was certainly an example of lay investiture by the Byzantines, namely the consecration of said lay scholar Photius.8 Power struggles for the Byzantine throne led to the alternating elevation of Ignatius and Photius to the Patriarchate of Constantinople over the duration of the controversy, with this oscillation causing more and greater tensions between the Church of Rome and the Eastern patriarchates, namely Constantinople.

It is important to note that the Photian Schism is essentially the practice-run for the disputation of the filioque issue, which will be discussed later in this paper. The issue was taken up by Photius and Ignatius as one of the disagreements which fueled their many conflicts, which were actually rather political in nature.9 As a Roman-Constantinopolitan conflict which has merited the label “Schism,” the Photian affair foreshadows the importance of the filioque issue in later years and illustrates the tension capable of being generated between the ecclesiastical powers-that-be in Rome and Constantinople.

An important link between the Greek East and Latin West had been the presence in the East of certain Latin-speaking peoples, including the peoples of the Balkans. Many of these Greeks fled the Balkans, however, when the Slavs invaded, which happened as early as the 6th-century, and many Balkan Greeks migrated to Sicily and the southern part of the Italian peninsula, areas later, at least in part, to be commandeered by the Normans and taken out of the normal circulation and society of Italy for some time. This limited the cross-cultural impact of the Latinate Greeks in the West.10 Overland contact between the East and the West was also limited due to the interposition of the Slavs. The Latin West and the Greek East became more isolated each from the other due to the Slavic migration, and cultural independence became a more pronounced matter due to the elimination of this culturally and linguistically Greek crossroads in the Balkans.

The de-Latinization (linguistically speaking) of the Balkans also eventually led to the long-lasting disputes between Constantinople and Rome regarding ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the territory, particularly in Moravia and Bulgaria. This conflict brewed for centuries and led to further alienation between Rome and Constantinople. The dispute was exacerbated by Bulgarian leaders “playing one side off against the other” in a game designed to exact the best deal from the two churches.11

Religious divisions in the region, including divisions caused by the additional, later introduction of Islam into the Balkan Peninsula, have persisted until the present day and have motivated much ethnic conflict in what is often described as “the former Yugoslavia.” This modern state of affairs, having recently been improved by international action, can be said to have been possibly affected by the lack of a unified church policy with regards to the region during medieval times. As a result of the quarreling of the Eastern and Western Churches over the region, various forms of religious practices developed in “the former Yugoslavia.” The mishandling of the Balkans and the church rivalry associated therewith exacerbated the tensions between East and West in medieval times and laid the foundation for the post-Tito nightmare in “the former Yugoslavia.”

The greatest doctrinal conflict between the future Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches around the time of the schism in question was caused by the Western inclusion of the filioque in the standard profession of faith of the Church. This creed had been based on an ecumenical consensus during the proceedings of the First Council of Nicaea in 325. The filioque issue stemmed from the unilateral inclusion of this Frankish addition to the creed by the papacy. This inclusion indicated that the Holy Spirit “proceeds” from the Father “and the Son” (Latin: filioque) rather than abiding by the Nicene tradition of the procession of the Holy Spirit only from the Father. The change was made to help to solidify the trinitarian nature of local Christianity in Frankish areas and their vicinities in Western Europe.12 These areas were struggling against non-trinitarian heretics spawned by the long-term proliferation of the ideas of Arius regarding the nature of Christ among certain Germanic tribes, some of which having carried the Arian heresy as part of their religious practice for centuries.

Modern Christian religious thinkers on both sides of the filioque divide generally agree that the issue in and of itself was not and certainly is not justification for the schism.13 Catholics and Orthodox now regard each other as fully legitimate and genuine Christians despite the flap over the creed, although each camp still believes that their respective brand of Christianity is the only version that is completely correct.14 The tolerance that does exist between the Catholics and the Orthodox is due in part to the rapprochement of the two churches in modern times, with some events germane to this topic unfolding in modern Turkey at the time of the writing of this paper through the visit of Pope Benedict XVI to meet with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I in Istanbul.15 At the time of the “Schism of 1054,” however, one doctrinal error was seen by many religious scholars as something that could jeopardize the disposition of one’s immortal soul, so the stakes were seemingly higher for the members of the 11th-century Church.

Theologically speaking, however, when you carry forward all the trinitarian connotations of the analyses of both the filioque and non-filioque approaches, you end up with the same result: the person of God, which is three divine persons in one, receives and gives the Holy Spirit in all its aspects within the singular nature of the godhead. There is little meat on this bone to make much of a meal; whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from one or two sources, the Spirit is still integrally part of the Holy Trinity, which is tripartite but also unitary, which implies the real and eminent presence of the Holy Spirit in the other members of the Trinity. As well we must remember that orthodox Christian theology includes the observation that the Holy Spirit is everywhere, including with the other members of the Trinity, due to God’s omnipresence. The omnipresence of God and the unitary-but-tripartite nature of God are two of the most fundamental of Christian doctrines and are crucial here for debunking the Orthodox arguments against the filioque.

One set of causes of the Schism of 1054 has to do with political geography. Since the time of Diocletian, the Roman Empire had been divided in an East-West manner for administrative purposes, in addition to all the other contrasts between East and West previously mentioned in this paper. Officials in the East answered to local authorities rather than to Rome, and the evolution of the center of power in the East was in the form of the new capitol city of Constantinople. Both of these trends further drew the administrations of the two regions into different functionalities, creating different kinds of political culture in the East and the West. 16

Ultimately, Theodosius I (r. 379 – 395) was the last Roman Emperor to rule both East and West; major political events and the political geography brought about a formal separation between the two regions and, to some extent, the two churches, as both the Patriarch of Rome and the Patriarch of Constantinople assumed respective roles in terms of the local polity as well as the region. This difference in political culture was not only reflected in affairs of state but also affected church politics as well, especially given the strong linkage between church and state at this point in the history of civilization and its religions.

Political geography also played a strong role due to the technological level that existed in Europe and the Near East during the centuries preceding and following the excommunications of 1054. National power had technological limitations with respect to the limited scope of the proliferation of key elements of that power, including the dissemination of critical information, an important part of nation-building. This limited scope stands in considerable contrast to limits by which many modern states are much less constrained. These limitations led to a degree of disconnectedness of some population centers from their respective national capitols, denigrating the sense of belonging that the outlying regions might have experienced in a different technological setting.

Because of this disconnectedness, the reduced psychological ties of the citizens of distant locales to the respective regional capitals could certainly play a role in the continued religious alienation of those locales from far away ecclesiastical centers of power. The creation and persistence of the schism could have been affected by a lack of reliable information penetrating much of the sparsely inhabited area of the Mediterranean region in a timely manner.

Difference of opinion over the appropriate marital status of the clergy was also an issue that caused alienation between East and West. The attempted dictation of a celibacy policy by the Roman Church to the Greek East was resented since the early traditions in all parts of the Church in the Byzantine-occupied areas of the Eastern Mediterranean had allowed for either clerical marriage or celibacy as a personal choice.17 Nicolaitism, a Western term for the doctrinal error of allowing married clergy, was during the 11th-century a banner issue for the reform-minded popes that came to power around 1054 and catalyzed a considerable amount of the conflict between the Eastern and Western Christian camps.

Other minor doctrinal conflicts existed as well, including a disagreement over what kind of bread to use at Eucharistic services, over the Latin practice of fasting on Saturdays, and over a number of false accusations hurled by either side during the years around 1054. These issues, even the ones that were valid, were little more than a smoke-screen raised by the parties to the dispute to cloud the personal nature of the quarrel at that time.18

The actions of Charlemagne and other Holy Roman Emperors also created political situations which exacerbated the estrangement between the Latin West and the Greek East, including the provision by the Holy Roman Empire of a military and political ally of consequence for the papacy. This new ally enabled some popes to resist influences or dictates from the Byzantine Emperor or the Patriarch of Constantinople.19 The politics of the Holy Roman Empire as they relate to the East-West schism process is a subject that deserves to be treated at a length well beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the situations created by the creation of the upstart Holy Roman Empire had grave repercussions for prospects of East-West unity, especially including the crowning of “Roman Emperor” Charlemagne as a rival to the “legitimate” Eastern heir to that appellation, the Byzantine Emperor. This figure was surely perceived by the majority of the Greek-speaking subjects of Constantinople as a “Roman Emperor,” a perception which served many who for good reason still regarded themselves as “Roman citizens.”

Issues surrounding the disagreement over the degree of the primacy of Rome over other historically prominent sees weighed into the calculus describing the widening gap in understanding between East and West. Prior to the wide acceptance of the “Schism of 1054,” Rome enjoyed primacy among the traditional patriarchates of the Church. However, the four eastern patriarchates, since the very early years of the history of the Church, regarded said primacy as an honorific only, or at best as indicating Rome as an avenue of appeal in cases of disagreement in the Church. Rome and a great many popes came to regard the honorific as carrying functional superiority that could enable the Western Church to exercise the direction of policy without the support and guidance of church councils. Thus there existed a considerable amount of stressed relations between East and West for some time before the actual schism, and this stress was concerned with the nature of the exact powers of the Pope.

The See of Rome and the See of Constantinople were the only two of the sees historically regarded as preeminent that were not under Muslim control in the 11th-century. So the bipolar nature of the church’s power structure led to tensions between the two poles, Rome and Constantinople, not in a manner completely dissimilar to other geopolitical bipolarities throughout history, such as the modern Cold War or the situation that existed between the Roman Republic and Carthage. Seemingly routine disputes would become extraordinarily exacerbated by the accumulating tension formed by myopically focusing only on one adversary.

The loss of south Italy to the Normans in the 11th-century worsened the political situation that existed between Rome and Constantinople. As mentioned earlier, the natural society of Italy was affected by this conquest. As well, with the growing power of the Normans at issue, it should have been expected that the Pope and the Byzantine Emperor should have cooperated in controlling their mutual enemy. Despite these common vested interests, among others, the personality conflicts and petty criticisms prevailed, preventing an effective papal-Byzantine alliance and thereby helping Robert Guiscard and his successors establish themselves on the Italian peninsula and Sicily.

The “Schism of 1054” is often billed as one of the principal splits in Christianity and for good reason. The division has parted Catholic from Orthodox, West from East, in a manner that has been as comprehensive and important as any of the many schisms that have occurred in the history of Christianity. The causes, however, cannot be oversimplified to entail only the immediate conflict of 1054; many different types of forces, including social, cultural, political, ecclesiastical, and idiosyncratic, led to the dissolution of the bonds between Eastern and Western Christianity.

As to which cause or set of causes that most precipitated the division between Eastern and Western Christianity, any identification would be purely speculative. The finer points of theology, such as the filioque, probably did not concern the masses greatly and were a matter of vibrant concern only to church leaders. The people of East and West were different because of their cultures, their languages, and their political loyalties, all of which provided the framework for disputed church policies to kick-off the technical religious disagreements that were the catalyst, but not the substance, of the schism between East and West.

Ultimately people behave according to their cultural and individual imperatives, with less attention to the fineries of theology than to the matters of everyday life. While the obscure points of theology were more important to the general population in the medieval world than they are today, especially in the East, the cultural fabric, different from East to West and experienced in person everyday by all the citizens of their respective regions, is more important than theological abstraction as a cause for the alienation and ultimate schism between the Eastern and Western Churches.
Notes

1. Hussey, The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire, 133.
2. The Encyclopedia Press, Inc., The Catholic Encyclopedia, 1914 ed., “The Eastern
Schism,” http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13535a.htm. December 19, 2006.
3. Magoulias, Byzantine Christianity, 116. The “Schism of 1054” made it more
possible and more likely that the conflicts that existed between Byzantium and the
West during the course of the Crusades would ultimately lead to the disastrous
Fourth Crusade which heralded the beginning of the end of the Byzantine Empire.
The fall of Byzantium opens wide the door for the Ottoman Turks and other invaders
Into Europe and the Near East, a trend that eventually affects the West in countless
ways.
4. Runciman, The Eastern Schism, 163-4.
5. Ibid., 4.
6. Ibid.
7. The Oriental Orthodox, consisting of the Armenian Apostolic, Coptic Orthodox,
Ethiopian Orthodox, and Syrian Orthodox, and a few other groups, maintain that
they are “miaphysitic,” i.e. believing Christ has only one nature which is both
human and divine. Chalcedonian Christians, by and large, still regard the Oriental
Orthodox as being monophysitic since the two natures of Christ are not included.
Despite this difference of opinion, Chalcedonian Christians look favorably on the
Oriental Orthodox as having a compatible Christology. See Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc., Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2006 ed., “Monophysite,”
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9053408 >.

8. Runciman, The Eastern Schism, 23.
9. Ibid., 24.
10. Robert Guiscard in fact took these Italian lands in part from culturally Greek people
in the 11th-century who answered to the Byzantine Emperor, which would have
compromised much of the Greek influence in the region for a time, including the
Greek culture and immigrants from the Balkans.
11. Runciman, The Eastern Schism, 25.
12. Ibid., 29.
13. Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, 92.
14. Clément, Conversations with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, 189.
15. Carried in the general news media, this event was heralded as a possible
breakthrough in Catholic-Orthodox relations. Any lasting results of the meeting
may take some time to determine.
16. Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society, 14.
17. Magoulias, 92.
18. Meyendorff, 95.
19. Congar, After Nine-Hundred Years, 22.

Bibliography

Benz, Ernst. The Eastern Orthodox Church: Its Thought and Life. Trans. Richard
Winston, et al. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1963.
Clément, Olivier. Conversations With Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I. Trans.
Paul Meyendorff. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997.
Congar, Yves. After Nine-Hundred Years: The Background of the Schism Between the
Eastern and Western Churches. New York City: Fordham University Press, 1959.
Geanakopolos, Deno J. Byzantine East and Latin West: Two Worlds of Christendom in
the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Studies in Ecclesiastical and Cultural History.
New York City: Barnes and Noble, 1966.
Greenslade, S. L. Schism in the Early Church. London: SCM Press, 1964.
Hore, A. H. Eighteen Centuries of the Greek Orthodox Church. London: James Parker
and Company, 1899.
Hussey, J. M. The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire. Oxford, UK: Clarendon
Press, 1986.
Magoulias, Harry J. Byzantine Christianity: Emperor, Church, and the West. Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1982.
Meyendorff, John. The Orthodox Church: Its Past and Its Role in the World Today.
Trans. John Chapin. New York City: Pantheon Books, 1960.
Ostrogorski, Georgije. History of the Byzantine State. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1957.
Runciman, Steven. The Byzantine Theocracy. London: Cambridge University Press,
1977.
Runciman, Steven. The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern
Churches During the XIth and XIIth Centuries. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press,
1955.
Sherrard, Phillip. The Greek East and Latin West: A Study in the Christian Tradition.
Limni, Greece: D. Harvey, 1995.
Treadgold, Warren. A History of the Byzantine State and Society. Stanford CA:
Stanford University Press, 1997.
Ware, Kallistos. The Orthodox Church. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, UK: Penguin
Books, 1980.

Saturday, September 17, 2005

Proclivities for Terrorism in the Republic of Mali

Proclivities for Terrorism in the Republic of Mali
by John M. Thomas, Jr.
May 2002

Americans recognize, especially since September 11, 2001, that the phenomenon of international terrorism is not to be confined to one corner or the world or another, altering the long-standing psychological denial by the American populace of the possibility of a substantial foreign terrorist attack on American soil. The prevention of future acts of terrorism, now a topic of much greater interest in the U.S., will be a multifaceted process which will includes the development of skills needed to predict where international terrorists might find safe harbor in the future. These “breeding grounds” of terrorism that have enabled transnational terrorists groups to thrive must be identified and acted upon to prevent the growth and development of terror spawned from these regions.

Many quarters bear watching, but how does one predict which areas will become a breeding ground for terrorism? The National Intelligence Council (NIC), a federal agency which serves as “a center for U.S. Government mid-term and long-term strategic thinking and for Intelligence Community collaboration on substantive issues,” has attempted to answer that question.1 In one of its recent publications, the NIC theorizes that “states with poor governance; ethnic, cultural, or religious tensions; weak economies; and porous borders will be prime breeding grounds for terrorism. In such states, domestic groups will challenge the entrenched government, and transnational networks [will seek] safehavens.”2 The NIC also believes that “the trend away from state-supported political terrorism and toward more diverse, free-wheeling, transnational networks—enabled by information technology—will continue.”3

These opinions of the NIC represent a synthesis of the thinking of many in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other U.S. government intelligence and intelligence-related agencies. As such, this four-pronged “theory of causes” (TOC) provides a point of departure for examining the likelihood of the genesis of terrorism in a given area. This paper will use the TOC to evaluate one such area, the Republic of Mali, and, in particular, will consider whether areas populated by the Tuareg in Northern Mali could be particularly vulnerable to an increased terrorist presence.

A few words of introduction are in order regarding the obscure state to be explored. The “Mali Federation” is a former French colony that gained its independence in 1960. At this time a federation consisting of Senegal and the present-day Republic of Mali was created. The Senegalese withdrew from the “Mali Federation” soon after independence, leaving the landlocked “Sudanese Republic,” which was soon to be renamed the Republic of Mali, to fend for itself.

The early years of the Republic of Mali were tumultuous. Mali’s second military dictator, Moussa Traore, was eventually elected to office under a functioning constitution. After years of severe drought while relying on agriculture as the prime element of the economy, Traore was overthrown in 1991, and a democratic constitution was ratified with a civilian presidency.
Mali’s north consists of desert and semi-desert, is sparsely populated, and is culturally much different than the south, which largely uses the Niger River as the basis for economic activity. Mali has a population near eleven million, possesses few natural resources, has a large debt, and has an economy that is very vulnerable to fluctuations in the world economy and demand for its primary export, cotton.

Applying the first criteria of the TOC (poor governance) to the Republic of Mali, several issues arise here regarding the strength of Malian state since it achieved independence from its colonial ruler. While Mali enjoys a high degree of democratic rule at the present time, the Republic has not always enjoyed such freedoms since decolonization and is subject to the winds of political fortune that frequently blow through the African continent, taking with them leaders and systems of government alike. Malian leaders, in the early days of independence, pandered to the interests of the Eastern Bloc in return for economic and military support, then within a few short years vacillated and sought Western help for their fledgling state. A mere Army lieutenant was able to effect the coup in 1968 that turned Mali more decisively to the West, underlining further the underdeveloped and vulnerable nature of the Malian political and military system at the time. Democratization can be said to have begun in Mali in earnest only more than two decades later in 1990, shortly before Traore was overthrown.4

Considering how recently democratic trends have taken root and developed in Mali, the permanence of such a change is questionable at best. Mali is still vulnerable to a return to one-party rule, which had previously brought brutal political oppression and more widespread corruption.5 The qualities of poor governance implied in the TOC would likely return under one-party rule, which would put the Republic of Mali at risk with respect to this criteria.
Secondly, the TOC mentions “ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions” as creating the necessary environment for the development of terrorist activity. At first glance, Mali scores high in the area of religious homogeneity, seemingly a major plus for stability in the evaluation of this criteria. Ninety percent of the population is Muslim, with the balance being practitioners of some form of native religion, as well as a few Christians.6

The Muslim population, however, deserves some scrutiny as to its sectarian nature both historically and presently. In the early half of the 20th century, the population of “French Soudan” became susceptible to a Sufi-like movement within Islam known as Hamallism. The movement consisted of “vassal tribes reacting against the Mauritanian Qâdiriyya and the Tukulor Tijâniyya orders which collaborated with the colonial power [France] and had a privileged position in society.”7 The Hamallists declared jihad against the colonial masters and their tribal partners and offered violent resistence,8 but the French soon left on their own accord, obviating the need for and effectively ending the movement. Violent religious doctrines which could facilitate terrorism have thus been developed in Mali in the past and certainly stand a chance for recurrence in the future.

Mali, like most sub-Saharan African states, is an amalgam of various ethnic and cultural groups vying for power and influence. Strictly speaking, nearly all African states south of the Sahara would fail this part of the second criteria of the TOC outright. Mali is no exception. The CIA Factbook cites eight easily identifiable ethnic groups, three of which are related but together still compose only about half of the population, leaving the other five groups to comprise forty-five percent of the population.9 This means, at any given time, at least four ethnic groups (or their representatives) are required to agree to form a majority. In Mali, like most African states, representative government can be fractured by ethnic disputes, risking the longevity of democratic government and the stability required for stopping the fulfillment of the previously discussed first criteria of the TOC (poor governance).

The principal example of ethnic and cultural tension in Mali involves the Tuareg people of the northern part of the country. This specific example will be entertained later in this paper at some length.

The third criteria of the TOC is a weak economy. Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world with sixty-five percent of its area desert or semidesert, a GDP per capita of US$850, and few natural resources.10 It would be difficult to argue that the citizens of the Republic of Mali are, by and large, well enough off to be invulnerable to the financial incentives that could come their way as a result of a growth in the presence of terrorists in Mali. The hard cash that a well-organized terrorist movement could bring into this country would make a substantial material difference in the quality of the lives of the collaborators.

Undesirable economic conditions can also raise the level of dissatisfaction with standard-of-living and prospects for the future. This dissatisfaction is believed by some to be a component in the development of militant fundamentalist Islam and other forms of thought that can engender terrorism.11 This discontent weighs as well in the previously discussed second criteria of the TOC (ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions), with economic circumstances exacerbating social unrest.

The fourth criteria of the TOC, the presence of porous borders around the state in question, lends itself to one very simple analysis. A great deal of Mali’s border lies across the sands of the Sahara. Demarcation of such boundaries is often merely a formality, given the relative absence of population and development in these areas. Nomadic peoples frequently criss-cross desert and steppe boundaries in various places around the world without government monitoring.12 Mali, indeed all Saharan states, do not have porous borders. They have open borders to those who are willing to brave the dangers of the desert.

The southern part of the country has its porous border features as well. Mali has been identified by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as one of the principal areas from which slaves are exported in Africa,13 indicating that persons frequently leave the country in an uncontrolled manner. This lack of effective border control is likely to extend not only to those leaving, but also to those entering.

Thus by a simple analysis using the criteria established by the NIC to evaluate geographical areas as future breeding grounds for terrorism, the Republic of Mali bears some attention. All four of the criteria of the TOC are satisfied in at least some basic way, especially the fourth with considerably porous borders conspicuously facilitating the traffic of humans both into and out of the country. Having established this positive analysis, at least two questions are begged. Is Mali more or less vulnerable to playing safe-haven to terrorists than comparable states in the region? Are there any areas of the Republic of Mali that may be more vulnerable than others to terrorist infiltration and development?

To comment on the first question, a lengthier comparative analysis would be more appropriate and is not within the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the nations of Mauritania, Niger, and Chad all share characteristics with Mali that would fit in various ways with the criteria of the TOC. Regionalizing the concerns brought from the analysis of the TOC for Mali would seem a prudent view and could yield useful information on the possible terrorist-support dynamics of the region as well as for each individual country.

The Tuareg are one of the indigenous peoples found in the northern desert and semidesert areas of Mali. Numbering over 600,000 in Mali alone, the Tuareg have been “the most substantial challenge to Mali’s stability since independence.”14 Culturally related to the Berbers, Tuaregs share a common language and ethnicity, but, much like the Somalis, have exhibited high degrees of intertribal and interclan rivalries. After warfare with the French during their colonization period, the Tuareg resisted assimilation into the colonies in favor of retaining their defiant nomadic lifestyle. This continued separation kept the Tuareg “outside the web of political relationships and material benefits of the new states.”15

The Tuareg rebelled against the Malian government on two occasions, in 1962 and 1990. The latter rebellion is of more interest in relationship to the TOC. Political institutions in northern Mali were weak due to the estrangement of the Tuareg from the rest of Malian society. Cultural tensions abounded due to the influx of Western ideas through electronic and written media and their effect on Tuareg society.16 Mali’s economy had been devastated by the African drought that began in 1985. Borders also remained porous to the nomadic Tuaregs. All principal elements of the TOC are qualified as early as the 1990 rebellion, facilitating the possible growth and development of terrorism.

In addition to these TOC qualifications, a direct linkage between the Tuareg and world terror can be found beginning around the time of the first rebellion. Malian Lt. Col. Kalifa Keita writes:
“ [ Muammar ] Qadhafi incorporated some Tuareg volunteers into his
regular military forces. Others, he inducted into a Libyan-sponsored
‘Islamic Legion’ from which he subsequently dispatched Islamic
militants to Lebanon, Palestine, and Afghanistan. By the mid 1980’s, some of
Qadhafi’s Tuareg volunteers had acquired considerable combat
experience in various conflicts of the Near East and South Asia.”17
Many of these “Islamic Legionnaires” returned shortly before the second rebellion and contributed their skills and experience to the insurrection.

Given the satisfaction of several elements of the TOC specifically by the Tuareg occupied areas of northern Mali as well as the presence of elements of Qahhafi’s former army in this region, it stands to reason that northern Mali may prove to be more problematic than other parts of the state with respect to fostering terrorism. The reclusive “Blue Men of the Veil,” as the Tuaregs are often called, fanatical Muslims with easy access to only nominal borders and the inclination to resist central authority, may well find themselves in a crossroads of nascent terror.

As may the state of Mali as a whole, as current events quickly have elucidated. On April 8, 2002, thousands of Malians took to the streets to decry America and Israel for their policies in Palestine. American anti-terrorist operations around the world were denounced, and religious leaders issued religious curses on American leaders for their perceived anti-Islamic prejudices. Political leaders promised to influence Mali’s fledgling electoral process by attempting to get elected as many Islamists to political office as possible.18

The future of the Republic of Mali is fraught with many questions, including those of an economic, political, and social nature. All three of these areas of concern relate directly to the possible future present of terrorist activity and its ability to thrive in the region. This analysis illustrates some basic ways in which Mali may be vulnerable to the disease of terrorism. While Malians rally against America and give verbal support to their radical militant Islamist heroes, will they turn a blind eye when those Islamists come calling for shelter and succor?

Notes

1. United States. National Intelligence Council. “A Note From the Chairman.” By John L. Helgerson. April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/nic/about_page/index.htm.>
2. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts" December 2000. April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/global_trends_2015.html.>
3. Ibid.
4. Bingen, R. James, ed., Democracy and Development in Mali, East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2000. p. 257.
5. Bingen, pg. 256.
6. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. “Mali.” April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.>
7. Kenny, Joseph, OP. Dominican Order. Province of Nigeria and Ghana. “Chapter 13: The Jihad States: 17th to 19th Centuries.” The Spread of Islam Through North to West Africa. <http://www.op.org/nigeriaop/kenny/NWAfr/a13.htm.>
8. Kenny.
9. The World Factbook. “Mali.”
10. The World Factbook. “Mali.”
11. The World Economic Forum’s East Asia Summit interrelates “the root causes of terrorism and enduring poverty.” World Economic Forum. “After 11 September, the Root Causes of Terrorism and Poverty Must Be Addressed.” World Economic Forum’s East Asia Economic Summit 2001. October 29, 2001. April 21, 2002. <http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/After+11+September,
+the+Root+Causes+of+Terrorism+and+Poverty+Must+Be+Addressed.>
The UN environment chief also believes that “the forces of poverty, environmental degradation and hatred … give birth to the intolerance that can lead to fundamentalism and terrorist acts. ”US Environment Chief: Fight Root Causes of Terrorism.” Environmental News Service. April 21, 2002. http://www.ens-news.com/ens/sep2001/2001L-09-21-02.html
At a speech at Georgetown University, Sen. Joe Lieberman related economic position to the development of terrorism. Tim Sullivan. “US Must Fight Terrorism’s Causes, Lieberman Says.” The Hoya. Tuesday, January 15 ,2002 <http://www.thehoya.com/news/011502/news2.cfm.>
12. A prime example of these loosely-demarcated bounderies is in the southern Arabian peninsula. Semi-nomadic peoples frequently cross the bounderies between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Much of the same occurs (under normal circumstances) among the Pashtuns on the Afghani-Pakistani frontier. Also Keita, p. 8. Also Zachariah, K. C., et al. Migration in West Africa: Demographic Aspects. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 1981. p. 3.
13. United Nations. UN Integrated Regional Information Networks. allAfrica.com. “Regional Efforts Against Child Trafficking.” January 21, 2002. April 9, 2002. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200201210319.html.>
14. Keita, Kalifa Keita, Lt. Col. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel. Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998. p. 6.
15. Keita, p. 8.
16. Keita, p. 12.
17. Keita, p. 13.
18. “Mali: Islamists begin election campaign with harsh criticism of Israel and the USA.” Narr. Joan Baxter. “Network Africa” radio program. BBC World Service. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/networkafrica. April 8, 2002.

Bibliography


“After 11 September, the Root Causes of Terrorism and Poverty Must Be Addressed.” World Economic Forum’s East Asia Economic Summit 2001. October 29, 2001. April 21, 2002. <http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/After+11+September,
+the+Root+Causes+of+Terrorism+and+Poverty+Must+Be+Addressed.

Armajani, Yahya, et. al. Middle East: Past and Present. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1986.

Bingen, R. James, et al., ed. Democracy and Development in Mali. East Lansing MI:
Michigan University Press, 2000.

Brett, Michael, and Elizabeth Fentress. The Berbers. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell
Publishers, 1997. ISBN 0-631-16852-4. DT 193.5 B45 B74 1996. College of
Charleston Library.

Brown, Robert Merrill, et al., ed. Violent Persuasions: The Politics and Imagery of
Terrorism. Seattle: Bay Press, 1993.

Charlick, Robert B. Niger: Personal Rule and Survival in the Sahel. Boulder CO:
Westview, 1991.

Colvin, et. al. The Uprooted of the Western Sahel. New York: Praeger, 1981.

Crenshaw, Martha, ed. Terrorism in Africa. New York: MacMillan, 1994.

Crenshaw, Martha, ed. Terrorism in Context. University Park PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1995.

Gerster, Georg. Sahara. Berlin, Germany: Ullstein A. G., 1959.

Keita, Kalifa Keita, Lt. Col.. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel. Carlisle PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 1998.

Kenny, Joseph, OP. Dominican Order. Province of Nigeria and Ghana. “Chapter 13:
The Jihad States: 17th to 19th Centuries.” The Spread of Islam Through North to West Africa. <http://www.op.org/nigeriaop/kenny/NWAfr/a13.htm.>

“Mali: Islamists begin election campaign with harsh criticism of Israel and the USA.”
Narr. Joan Baxter. “Network Africa” radio program. BBC World Service.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/networkafrica. April 8, 2002.

Metz, Steven. Redefining American Strategy in Africa. Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, 2000.

Skreslet, Paula Youngman. Northern Africa: A Guide to Reference and Information
Sources. Englewood CO: Libraries Unlimited, 2000.

Snow, Donald M. Distant Thunder: Patterns of Conflict in the Developing World. 2nd
ed. Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997.

Sullivan, Tim. “US Must Fight Terrorism’s Causes, Lieberman Says.” The Hoya.
Tuesday, January 15, 2002.

United Nations. UN Integrated Regional Information Networks. allAfrica.com.
“Regional Efforts Against Child Trafficking.” January 21, 2002. April 9, 2002.
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200201210319.html.>

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About
the Future With Non-Government Experts.” December 2000. April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/global_trends_2015.html.>

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. “Mali.” April 5,
2002. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.>

United States. National Intelligence Council. “A Note From the Chairman.” By John L.
Helgerson. April 5, 2002. <http://www.cia.gov/nic/about_page/index.htm.>

”UN Environment Chief: Fight Root Causes of Terrorism.” Environmental News
Service. April 21, 2002. <http://www.ens-news.com/ens/sep2001/2001L-09-21-02.html.>

Wellard, James. The Great Sahara. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1965.

Zachariah, K. C., et al. Migration in West Africa: Demographic Aspects. Oxford UK:
Oxford University Press, 1981.